Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) is an encryption method that allows quantum computation to be performed on one party's private data with the program provided by another party, without revealing much information about the data nor about the program to the opposite party. It is known that information-theoretically-secure QHE for circuits of unrestricted size would require exponential resources, and efficient computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized quantum circuits have been constructed. In this paper we first propose a QHE scheme for a type of circuits of polynomial depth, based on the rebit quantum computation formalism. The scheme keeps the restricted type of data perfectly secure. We then propose a QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good circuit privacy. We also propose an interactive QHE scheme with asymptotic data privacy, but the circuit privacy is not good, in the sense that the party who provides the data could cheat and learn about the circuit, but we show that such cheating would generally affect the correctness of the evaluation, and could be caught by the opposite party in an interactive scheme with embedded verifications. Such scheme with verification has satisfactory circuit privacy, while all but a constant number of bits of information about the data is secure, where the constant is determined by security requirements. The entanglement and classical communication costs in these schemes are polynomial in the circuit size and the security parameter (if any).
I. INTRODUCTION
As quantum computers are difficult to build, a practical way for doing quantum computation is using the clientserver model. The quantum computer is placed at the server, and the clients may have limited quantum capabilities. The client and the server may want to hide some information about their program or data from each other. This is part of the reason why security in bipartite quantum computing is of interest. Bipartite quantum computation may also be related to or directly implement some classical or quantum cryptographic tasks. Two problems in bipartite quantum computing have attracted a lot of attention. One of them is blind quantum computing, and the other is quantum homomorphic encryption, the main topic of this paper.
In classical cryptography, homomorphic encryption (HE) is an encryption scheme that allows computation to be performed (effectively on the plaintext after decryption) while having access only to the ciphertext. A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme allows for any computation to be performed in such fashion. The known schemes [1, 2] are based on computational assumptions. Quantum (fully) homomorphic encryption (QHE and QFHE respectively) allows (universal) quantum computation to be performed without accessing the unencrypted data. Schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] allow two stages of communication, with some initial shared entangled state. The requirements are that the final computation result is correct, and the data and the final computation result are known only to the data-provider, who learns little about the circuit performed beyond what can be deduced from the result of the computation itself. There is no limit to the quantum capabilities of any party. We regard interactive QHE schemes as those schemes with similar security characteristics as the usual QHE schemes, but allows many rounds of communication. We allow any party to abort during the interactive protocol.
It is known that information-theoretically-secure (ITS) QHE for circuits of unrestricted size necessarily incurs exponential overhead [9, 12, 13] . For the special case of unrestricted quantum input states and perfect data privacy, a stronger lower bound is stated in [14] . Some computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized quantum circuits have been constructed [7, 8, 10] .
In this paper, we firstly introduce a QHE scheme for a restricted type of circuits (Scheme 1). It keeps the real product input state perfectly secure, and the circuit privacy is optimal up to a constant factor. We then propose a QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy and near-optimal circuit privacy. The entanglement and classical communication costs in both schemes scale linearly with the product of input size and circuit depth.
We then introduce a partially-secure interactive QHE scheme, which is Scheme 4 in Sec. V. It is independent from the two schemes above. The Scheme 4 has asymptotic data privacy, but the circuit privacy is not good. We then propose an enhanced version with embedded verifications, in which Bob, who provides the circuit, may choose to abort if the messages returned from Alice during the protocol do not pass his verifications. Such enhanced scheme has both quite satisfactory data privacy and circuit privacy: it leaks a constant amount of information about the data, where the constant is determined by the security requirements; and the circuit privacy is good since the cheating by Alice is likely to be caught. Thus this scheme is at least partially secure when the input size is larger than some constant, and becomes more secure as the input size grows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review some literature results. In Sec. III we will introduce some preliminary knowledge. Secs. IV presents the two QHE schemes which are secure for some types of data and some types of circuits. Sec. V contains a partially secure scheme for computing a linear polynomial with boolean input and two related schemes for general polynomial-sized quantum circuits. Sec. VI contains the conclusion and some open problems.
II. REVIEW OF PAST RESULTS
In the following we put our work in the context of literature results on quantum homomorphic encryption and related problems.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) is a task in which Alice knows both the data and program but can only do limited quantum operations, and the main part of the computation is to be carried out by Bob, who learns neither the data nor much about the program. The output is to be known to Alice but not Bob (this is different from QHE, in which the party with the program does not know the output). Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi presented a BQC scheme [15] using the measurement-based quantum computing model. An experimental demonstration is in [16] . There are other BQC schemes based on the circuit model [17] , or the ancilla-driven model [18] . The possibility of Alice being a classical client (allowing partial leakage of the client's information) is discussed in [19] .
In Yu et al [14] , it is shown that the condition of perfect data privacy implies an information localization phenomenon, and this puts restrictions on the possible forms of QHE schemes and their complexity. The Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 of [14] are for the case that input states are unrestricted. For restricted input states such as real product states, the Scheme 1 in the current work and the scheme in [9] provide examples for which the above statements do not apply.
Newman and Shi [12] (see also [13] ), concurrently with Lai and Chung [9] , showed that ITS-QFHE schemes require communication cost (including entanglement cost) that is at least exponential in the number of input qubits, where "ITS" allows a negligible amount of data leakage. This is based on the work of Nayak [20] .
On computing two-party classical functions with quantum circuits, Lo [21] studied the data privacy in the case that the output is on one party only, and both parties know the function. The security of two-party quantum computation for fixed classical function with both parties knowing the outcome has been studied by Buhrman et al [22] .
There is a line of work on partially-ITS QHE, which are sometimes limited to certain types of circuits. In the scheme of Rohde et al [3] , only a logarithmic amount of information about the data is hidden, and the type of circuit is limited to Boson sampling. Tan et al [5, 11] presented QHE schemes that allow some types of quantum circuits and hides only partial information (but more than that in [3] ) about the data. Ouyang et al [6] presented a scheme that hides almost all information about the data, but can only perform Clifford gates and a constant number of non-Clifford gates. In the scheme in [6] , the party with initial data could cheat by replacing the mixed qubits by pure qubits in some particular input state to gain partial knowledge about the Clifford gates applied, without affecting the correctness of the evaluation. The degree of circuit privacy is related to the size of the code, thus it is in a tradeoff with data privacy.
The following results are based on the existence of computationally-secure classical homomorphic encryption schemes. Broadbent and Jeffery [7] presented two computationally-secure QFHE schemes that are relatively efficient for polynomial-sized quantum circuits with limited use of T gates (and arbitrary use of Clifford gates). A compact QFHE scheme was proposed by Dulek, Schaffner and Speelman [8] . Its complexity of decryption (but not the overall computation and communication costs) could be independent of the size of the circuit to be evaluated, by choosing the classical HE scheme in it appropriately. Mahadev [10] presented a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme using classical homomorphic encryption schemes with certain properties. The client holding the program in the scheme is classical. Alagic et al devised a computationally-secure QFHE scheme with verification [23] , where the client is in some cases completely classical.
Verification of quantum computations is an interesting problem on its own, but the study of this problem has been closely related to that of blind quantum computing. The fact that it is related to QHE has been hinted in [10, 23, 24] . Usually, the verification problem involves a quantum prover and a quantum verifier, and the prover tries to convince the verifier that a quantum computation has been done as planned. Most studies assume the verifier to have some quantum capabilities [17, [25] [26] [27] [28] . There are also significant progress in using a classical or almost classical verifier [23, 24, 28, 29] . The protocols in [28] show that verification can be done after the computation is done, while not necessarily achieving blindness of the computation.
Some schemes for delegated quantum computation have been proposed [4, 30, 31] . In their original form, they usually have good data privacy but are not necessarily strong in circuit privacy. The Supplementary Note 1 of [4] contains a method based on so-called "universal circuits" to achieve blind quantum computing (hiding the information about the circuit which is initially on the same party as the data) but this does not make it useful for the QHE problem, since the input data and the program are on opposite parties in QHE, unlike in BQC. It is pointed out in [15] (with details in [32] ) that the protocol in [30] can be modified to become a blind quantum computing protocol having circuit privacy. This method is also not useful for QHE.
Some lower bounds on the length of classical encryption key in an ITS QHE scheme can be found in [33] .
III. PRELIMINARIES
First, we give a definition for quantum homomorphic encryption. Note the Encryption algorithm below absorbs both the key generation algorithm and the encryption algorithm in [7] . The measurements are explicitly allowed.
Definition 1. A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (QHE) E contains the following three algorithms, where λ is the security parameter, and T refers to a quantum circuit which may contain measurements and quantum gates controlled by classical functions of measurement outcomes, φ is an initial entangled resource state shared by Alice and Bob, and σ is the input data state of Alice.
1. Encryption algorithm Encrypt E (λ, σ, φ). The algorithm outputs some quantum state Π called the ciphertext.
The reduced state of Π on Alice's and Bob's systems are denoted Π a and Π b , respectively.
Evaluation algorithm
A scheme is correct if for any input state σ with associated ciphertext Π, and any circuit T chosen from a set of permitted quantum circuits T E , Decrypt E (λ, Π a , Π ′ b ) = T (σ) (up to a possible global phase). A scheme with perfect data privacy is one such that Bob cannot learn anything about the input σ, except the size of the input, from Π b . The requirement of circuit privacy refers to that Alice does not learn anything about the circuit performed beyond what can be deduced from the result of the computation itself. In actual protocols we seem only able to approach this goal. A quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme is one that is homomorphic for all circuits, i.e. the set T E is the set of all unitary quantum circuits. For more details about the security notions in QHE, see [7] . We regard interactive QHE schemes as those have similar security characteristics as the usual QHE schemes, but allow many rounds of communication. Naturally, any one party may choose to abort during the interactive protocol.
Here is a brief note about data privacy. It is well known [see for example Theorem 1(ii) of [34] ] that if a unitary is exactly and deterministically implemented on all possible pure input states, no information about the input is leaked to the environment (which can be understood as the opposite party in our setting). Hence, data privacy is sort of trivial in some cases, but becomes an interesting problem when data privacy is more important than the correctness of computation, or when the computations are not restricted to unitaries, or when the type of input states is restricted (say real product inputs only). The QHE Schemes 3 and 4 in this paper satisfy that the correctness of evaluation in general implies both data privacy and circuit privacy, and since arbitrary measurements can be done at the end, the computations here are not limited to unitaries. (The expression "in general" means excluding some classes of computations in which the output contains all information about the circuit, e.g. the special case in Scheme 3 where the polynomial has only one term.) As far as we know, this phenomenon of "correctness implies privacy" is not previously known for non-unitary computations, and is thus a strong point of our schemes.
Denote the Pauli operators by
Clifford gates is defined as the set of unitaries U satisfying U P U † = ±P ′ , where P and P ′ are tensor products of Pauli operators. The n-qubit Clifford gates form a group called Clifford group. Since we ignore the global phase here, the size of the n-qubit Clifford group is 1 8 of an expression given in [35] . In particular, the one-qubit Clifford group has 24 elements. Let the rotations of angle θ about the three axes of the Bloch sphere be R y
, H = 1 √ 2 1 1 1 −1 , and P = 1 0 0 i . Any one-qubit Clifford gate (ignoring global phase, same below) can be decomposed using products of R y ( π 2 ) (proportional to e i π 4 σy ) and R z ( π 2 ) (proportional to e i π 4 σz ) in different sequences. The n-qubit Clifford gates can be decomposed into products of one-qubit Clifford gates and the CNOT (controlled-σ x ) gate. The Clifford gates and the T gate together form a universal set of gates for quantum computing. For more about universal sets of gates, see [36] . In this paper, the term "EPR pair" refers to two qubits in the state 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ). Let |+ denote 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ), and |− denote 1 √ 2 (|0 − |1 ). We shall adopt the rebit quantum computation formalism in [37] in our schemes. (See [38] for more about simulating the usual quantum circuit or Hamiltonian within the rebit formalism.) States of complex amplitudes can be represented by states of real amplitudes with only one extra qubit. Let there be an ancillary qubit with an orthonormal basis {|R , |I }. The following non-unitary encoding is used in [37] :
where a, b, c, d are real numbers. When there are n qubits in the initial input, only one ancillary qubit is needed. This ancillary qubit will be called the "phase qubit" in this paper. For Scheme 1 in this paper, we only need to deal with real input states, and in this case the initial encoding is trivial. Next, we introduce how to apply gates on such representation. A unitary rotation R z (θ) in the Z basis of an original qubit is mapped to a controlled-R y (2θ) on the real (i.e. original) qubit and the phase qubit, with the real qubit as the control. A unitary rotation in the Y basis of an original qubit is still the same gate on the original qubit, and no action is needed on the phase qubit. An entangling two-qubit gate F ( π 2 ) [which is controlled-R y (π)] is implemented by the same gate on the original qubits, and no action is needed on the phase qubit. These gates are all real (meaning that their matrix elements are real), and they can generate all possible unitary operations on any number of qubits, hence quantum computation in this particular representation can be done using only real gates. Let us denote three gates (on the logical qubit) R z ( π 2 ), R y ( π 2 ) and F ( π 2 ) as forming the gate set S 0 . These three gates can generate the Clifford group on any number of logical qubits, and each of them can be implemented using real gates in the rebit formalism.
In the following paragraphs, we show how an unknown logical one-qubit Clifford gate can be implemented up to a phase by just performing the one-qubit gates in S 0 and the uncertain gates in the set {I, R y ( π 2 ), σ y , R y (3 π 2 )}. We shall call the latter gate the uncertain R y ( kπ 2 ) gate. The uncertain R y ( kπ 2 ) gate on Alice's side is generated using the gadget shown in Fig. 1 which initially contains an EPR pair shared by Alice and Bob. Alice performs a controlled-iσ y gate with her part of the EPR pair as the control and the data qubit (assumed to be real) as the target. Then she performs a R y ( π 2 ) gate on her qubit in the EPR pair and measures it in the Z basis (with basis states being |0 or |1 ). Bob performs a R y ( jπ 2 ) gate and does a measurement in the Z basis, where j ∈ {0, 1}. The choice of j determines the gate applied on Alice's qubit up to a correction R y (π) = −iσ y and a phase. Such correction can be commuted through the Clifford gates performed later with some Pauli operators as corrections.
Inspired by an H-gate gadget construction in [27] , we give a construction using R z ( π 2 ) and R y ( jπ 2 ) for some integers j to implement one of the four gates R z ( kπ 2 ), where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We have
where γ k are real constants, and R
gate can be implemented using the uncertain R y ( kπ 2 ) gate and the gate R z ( π 2 ) which is in S 0 . Since R z ( π 2 ) and R y ( π 2 ) generate the single-qubit Clifford group, the two types of uncertain gates generate the same group.
We also notice that a T y = R y ( π 4 ) gate can be implemented using the same gadget. Alice's action is still the same as before. Bob does some gate R y ( jπ 4 ) with j = 1 or 3 before doing a Z-basis measurement. The choice of j depends on Alice and Bob's previous measurement results. All previous gadgets and fixed gates give rise to some Pauli operators known to Bob (which are to be corrected by Alice later), and these Pauli operators cause some Pauli operator Z on Bob's qubit in the gadget, which is corrected by Bob's choice of gate before measurement in the gadget. Generally, Bob may implement a R y (θ) gate for any real θ, by suitably choosing his gate before measurement in the gadget. We omit the details here, since this is a special case of the more general multi-qubit Y -diagonal gate in Scheme 1 below.
The gadget for implementing Y-axis rotations Ry( kπ 2 ) for integer k, or the Ty = Ry( π 4 ) gate on the first qubit up to a possible correction Ry(π) = −iσy and a possible phase depending on j and the measurement results. The entangled state Φ + = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ). For implementing Ry( kπ 2 ) with integer k, the integer j is 0 or 2, dependent only on the desired gate; for implementing the Ty, the integer j is 1 or 3, which depends on Alice's measurement outcome and the previous gates and measurement outcomes in the circuit. In Scheme 1, the last qubit is on Bob's side and the other two qubits are on Alice's side.
IV. TWO SCHEMES BASED ON REBITS
(1) About Scheme 1. The Scheme 1 is for a restricted type of circuits with restricted types of input states. The scheme uses the rebit quantum computation techniques in [37] . In the following, we denote the number of input data qubits as n.
The input state for Scheme 1 can be a product real state, but it can also be slightly more general: a product state of one-qubit real states on n − 1 qubits with a logical qubit state encoded in the rebit form (1), where the physical qubit for that exceptional logical qubit is the first data qubit. The output of Scheme 1 is of the form of (1). If the required output of Scheme 1 is classical, we only need to measure the qubits except the phase qubit to get the outcome. There might be other applications in which there are both real and imaginary parts in the output state, and the wanted part is real. Then we may still have some probability of success: do a measurement of the phase qubit in the {|R , |I } basis, and if the outcome corresponds to |R , we then measure the remaining qubits to get the result. If an output state with complex amplitudes is required, we may measure the phase qubit in the {(|R + |I )/ √ 2, (|R − |I )/ √ 2} basis, and if the result is the first one, we know the output state is correct.
The Scheme 1 allows continuous families of multi-qubit gates to be performed using relatively few gadgets. Bob is required to be able to perform more general operations than single-qubit measurements. The ability to perform two-qubit gates and single-qubit measurements is enough, but for better efficiency, he should do gates on more than two qubits.
Each layer of the circuit in the scheme implements some Y -diagonal unitary. Note that Y -diagonal unitaries on multiple qubits are not necessarily real, and the scheme is limited to implementing those real Y -diagonal unitaries. This is to guarantee the satisfaction of the requirement in rebit computation that the physical states are real.
The implementation of a Y -diagonal unitary uses the group-based protocol of remote implementation of unitary operators in [39] . Such protocol is derived from the protocol for implementation of double-group unitaries on two parties [34] . The double-group unitary protocol is a bipartite version of a group-based local quantum computing scheme [40] , with additional analysis in the case of projective representations. In the current work, we only deal with the simple case of ordinary representation of a group, and the group is Abelian: it is the K-fold direct product of the C 2 group (the group with two elements), denoted as C K 2 . In Scheme 1, K is the number of qubits involved in the logical Y -diagonal unitary. The paper [39] contains the detailed steps for the remote unitary protocol for the case of ordinary representation of a group. In Scheme 1, all K qubits are on Alice's side. The unitary operators used in the current case are K i=1 σ ai y,i , where a i ∈ {0, 1}, and the subscript i means the gate acts on qubit i. The target unitary U (on K data qubits) is diagonal in the Y axis, so it can be expanded using such a set of unitary operators:
where f is a group element in C K 2 , and can be represented using a binary string of length K, consisting of the bits
The coefficients c f appear in the unitary matrix C in the remote unitary scheme. From the equation (45) in [34] , the matrix C is defined using (ignoring phases since we are dealing with ordinary representations here)
where g −1 and f are group elements, and their product is the group multiplication. When each element is represented using a binary string of length K as mentioned above, the group multiplication is just the addition modulo 2 on each position of the vector. The corrections are V (g) † . In the current case, it amounts to I or σ y [equivalent to R y (π) up to a global phase] on each qubit. It is shown in [40] that when U is unitary and that the {V (f )} is an ordinary representation, it is guaranteed that there exists at least one C matrix that is unitary. Further, if the {V (f )} is a linearly independent set (which is true for the current case), then C is unique. These statements are extended in [34] to the case of projective representations. Some note about a particular step in the scheme: Bob's P or P † gates on his qubit in each gadget are the product of two gates: one of them is Z or I, which is a correction according to Alice's measurement outcome, and the other is a fixed P † gate to correct for the phase i in the controlled-iσ y gate in the gadget. Bob's such gates can also be absorbed into his unitary C.
The entanglement and classical communication costs in Scheme 1 scale linearly with the product of the input size and the circuit depth. For data privacy in Scheme 1, we have the following theorem, with the proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. When Scheme 1 is used for almost-commuting circuits with input state of the type specified in the scheme, the input data is perfectly secure.
A statement about the circuit privacy in Scheme 1 is in Theorem 3 below. The circuit privacy is already optimal up to a constant factor, since Alice can always learn O(n) bits of information about the circuit by looking at her output.
Scheme 1 QHE for almost-commuting circuits with product real input
The type of allowed circuits: an almost-commuting circuit. The logical circuit contains one or more real Y -diagonal unitaries which act on subsets of data qubits, interspersed with Rz( jπ 2 ) (j = 1, 3) on the first data qubit only. This implies that in the physical circuit, there may be multiple uses of the gate gadget on each data qubit, and the only other gates are the two-qubit controlled-Ry(jπ) on only one of the data qubits and the phase qubit. The type of allowed input states: a product real state, or with the first data qubit replaced by a complex qubit encoded in the rebit form (1).
1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice prepares the classical input state in the data qubits. Alice uses an ancillary qubit to be used as the phase qubit. It is assumed that both parties know the general form and the fixed one-qubit gates in the desired logical circuit, except that the details of the Y -diagonal unitaries are known only to Bob.
2. Alice implements the fixed gates and her part of the gate gadgets. The logical Rz( jπ 2 ) (j = 1, 3) gates are implemented using the controlled-Ry(jπ) gate on the real data qubit and her phase qubit. For a real Y -diagonal unitary acting on one or more qubits, it is implemented with the help of some gate gadgets (each on one data qubit) similar to the one in Fig. 1 4. Alice applies Pauli corrections on the data qubits and the phase qubit (the correction on the phase qubit may be omitted depending on applications). The output state is in the form of (1).
We note that there is a simplification of the scheme, using a method from [9] : for the last n − 1 data qubits, Alice could choose to apply possible R y (π) masks on them and send them to Bob before the protocol starts. In this way, the ancillary qubits for those data qubits can be saved. At the end of the protocol, Bob sends these qubits back, and Alice can recover this part of the output by undoing the R y (π) masks. An alternative way of simplification is by combining some gate gadgets so that each of the last n − 1 data qubits uses one gate gadget only.
(2) About Scheme 2. Based on Scheme 1, we propose the following Scheme 2 which works for a large class of polynomial-depth circuits. Its data privacy is only partial. Its circuit privacy is similar to that in Scheme 1.
The entanglement and classical communication costs in the two schemes scale linearly with the product of the input size and the circuit depth. For Scheme 2, numerical evidence suggests that not all polynomial-depth unitary circuits are allowed, since the scheme only allows real Y -diagonal unitaries performed by Bob and some local unitaries performed by Alice. But it at least implements a large class of unitaries. The data privacy in Scheme 2 is partial. From the proof of Theorem 1, it can be found that the two input states of all |0 and all |1 on the data qubits (with the phase qubit in the same initial state |0 ) cannot be distinguished by Bob. More generally, we have the following theorem, with the proof in Appendix A.
Scheme 2 QHE for a large class of circuits with real input and partial data privacy
The type of allowed circuits: the logical circuit contains one or more real Y -diagonal unitaries which act on all data qubits, interspersed with Rz( jπ 2 ) (j = 1, 3) on all of the data qubits. In the physical circuit, there are multiple uses of the gate gadget on each data qubit, interspersed with two-qubit controlled-Ry(jπ) gates between a data qubit (at arbitrary position) and the phase qubit. The type of allowed input states: real input states, or complex input states encoded in the rebit form of (1).
1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice prepares the classical input state in the data qubits. Alice has an ancillary qubit to be used the phase qubit. The desired circuit is decomposed using real Y -diagonal unitaries and the logical Rz( jπ 2 ) (j = 1, 3) gates. It is assumed that both parties know the general form and the fixed one-qubit gates in the desired circuit, except that the details of the Y -diagonal unitaries are known only to Bob.
2. Alice implements the fixed gates and her part of the gate gadgets. The logical Rz( jπ 2 ) (j = 1, 3) gates are implemented using the controlled-Ry(jπ) gate on the real data qubit and her phase qubit. For a real Y -diagonal unitary acting on all data qubits, it is implemented with the help of some gate gadgets (each on one data qubit) similar to the one in Fig. 1 but with Bob's operations modified. Each gadget initially contains an EPR pair of qubits: a on Alice's side, and b on Bob's side. Alice performs a local controlled-iσy gate with the qubit a as the control, and the real data qubit as the target. She then does a Ry( π 2 ) gate followed by a Z-basis measurement on the qubit a. She sends Bob all available measurement outcomes. 4. Alice applies Pauli corrections on the data qubits and the phase qubit (the correction on the phase qubit may be omitted depending on applications). The output state is in the form of (1).
Bob receives
Theorem 2. (i) When two input states in Scheme 2 are related to each other by a R y (π) on each data qubit and a R y (θ) on the phase qubit, where θ is any real number, Bob cannot distinguish these two input states at all. (ii) In Scheme 2, the following logical qubit encoded in rebit form is perfectly secure: the real part is encoded onto all n data qubits, with |0 and |1 encoded into |0 ⊗n and |1 ⊗n , respectively, and the phase qubit is just the one in Scheme 2.
For general complex input states encoded in rebit form, there is some evidence that partial data privacy exists in general. Specifically, there is numerical evidence that if classical information is encoded in some random (non-Pauli and non-real) product bases, and then encoded into the rebit form, Bob cannot generally distinguish the input states deterministically with a depth-2 circuit (depth-2 means there are two gadgets on each qubit line). Note that if the product bases above are chosen to be real, then Bob may deterministically distinguish the input states with a depth-2 circuit, according to the argument in the proof of Theorem 1.
For circuit privacy in the two schemes above, we have the following theorem. (The input size is n.)
Theorem 3. If Scheme 1 (or Scheme 2) is used for implementing a unitary, Alice learns at most O(n) bits of information about the circuit; If it is used for computing a classical function with k output bits, Alice learns at most k bits of information about the circuit.
Proof. In [41, Theorem 1], consider the case that the initial maximum classical mutual information I c (ρ) = 0, which means two systems A and B satisfy that ρ AB = ρ A ⊗ ρ B . After l bits of classical communication in one direction, the maximum classical mutual information is at most l bits. Consider adding a hypothetical program register in Scheme 1 or 2 on Bob's side, and call it C. After Alice has sent measurement outcomes to Bob in the scheme, the combined system of Alice's system (denoted A) and C is in a direct product (mixed) state. Then, after some local operations on Bob's side between C and Bob's other systems, the systems A and C is still in a direct product (mixed) state. Then l bits of classical message is sent by Bob to Alice. Applying [41, Theorem 1] to this case, we get that the final maximum classical mutual information is at most l bits. This means Alice learns at most l bits of information about the program register C. Thus the assertions hold. ⊓ ⊔
In Scheme 2, since Bob only sends 2n classical bits, Alice can learn at most 2n bits of information about the circuit. We think this amount is optimal for a sufficiently large class of circuits such as the one in Scheme 2), since Alice could always use superdense coding to learn about 2n bits from the output of the computation.
V. AN INTERACTIVE QHE SCHEME
Before describing the main interactive QHE scheme and its enhanced version, we first introduce the non-interactive Scheme 3. It is almost a subroutine in the main Scheme 4, except that it is altered a little when used in the main scheme.
(1) About Scheme 3. We propose the following Scheme 3 for computing linear polynomials with classical input. It is for computing y = (c + n i=1 a i x i ) mod 2, where x i are bit values of Alice's classical input, and a i and c are constant bits known to Bob. The Scheme 3 uses 2nk EPR pairs in the teleportations, where k is a positive integer that both parties agree on. The Alice's data x i in scheme are asymptotically secure for large k, and Bob's attempts to learn about the data would affect the correctness of evaluation. However, Bob's input (the a i ) are not secure: Alice could initially entangle her input qubits with some auxiliary qubits, and carry out the scheme as if she had used the usual input states, to learn some information about Bob's input a i , at the cost of not computing the distributed outcome correctly, although she can compute the correct outcome herself. Such property is exploited below to yield a protocol with verifications such that Alice's cheating can be caught by Bob.
The data in Scheme 3 is partially secure for any fixed k. For any (i, j) pair, it can be found that the average density operator (averaged over the possible values of s j and t ij ) for the two-qubit state corresponding to each input bit x ij are not orthogonal for the cases x ij = 0 and x ij = 1. The trace distance of the two density operators is 1 2 . If Bob chooses a best POVM measurement, he has probability 3 4 of guessing the value of x ij correctly. Thus Bob's probability of correctly guessing x i approaches 1 2 rapidly when k increases, meaning that he gets little information about x i . Since POVM measurements generally perturb the original state, it can be expected that the correctness of the computation cannot be guaranteed when these POVMs are done, and in fact, in the current case, the requirement of exact correctness of the computation implies that Bob cannot get any information about the value of x ij , and thus he cannot find out the x i . If approximate correctness is required, Bob still cannot get much information about the value of x i .
For circuit privacy, we first discuss the case of Alice being honest, i.e. she exactly follows the protocol: in this case, Bob's sending of functions of measurement outcomes in the teleportations do not reveal useful information. Thus Alice learns at most 1 bit of information about the circuit, for the same reason as shown in the proof of Theorem 3 in the last section. For the case of a cheating Alice, she could use some other input state, or initially entangle her input qubits with some auxiliary qubits, and carry out the scheme as if she had used the usual input states, to learn some information about Bob's input a i . Her best choice in the case of n = 1 is to use the two qubit state 1 2 (|00 +|01 +|10 −|11 ) for a particular (i, j) pair. After Bob returns two qubits, she can find out Bob's input a i with certainty. But if Alice cheats, she generally cannot get a definite distributed outcome a i x ij (which is expected to exist as the XOR of two bits at the two parties) related to the particular x ij . Although she may learn a i by cheating and compute a i x ij by herself, such computation result is on Alice's side only, while in the original scheme, it is distributed as the XOR of two bits at opposite parties. If Bob asks Alice to send back her part of the (classical) result to combine with his corresponding mask bit (which is itself the XOR of two local bits), an error would sometimes occur. The technical reason that for those j for which Alice cheated, she cannot definitely make the distributed outcome correct is Scheme 3 Partially-secure QHE for computing linear polynomials with classical input
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c + n i=1 aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of Alice's classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a positive integer k related to the security of the scheme. A suitable choice of k for a single use of the current scheme is O(log 1 ǫ ), where ǫ is a small real number indicating the targeted amount of leakage of each qubit of data.
2. (a) For each i, Alice randomly chooses k bits xij satisfying that xi = k j=1 xij mod 2. Alice generates random bits sj, where j = 1, . . . , k. The random bits sj are independent from each other and from the bits xij, and each may be 1 with probability exactly 1 2 . (b) For each (i, j) pair, Alice encodes xij's value 0 into |00 (when sj = 0) or |++ (when sj = 1), and xij's value 1 into |10 (when sj = 0) or |+− (when sj = 1).
(c) For each pair of qubits, she teleports them to Bob without telling him the bit for Z correction on the first qubit nor the bit for X correction on the second qubit. When sj = 0, she records the bit for X correction on the second qubit as tij , otherwise she records the bit for Z correction on the first qubit as tij. Then tij is a random bit.
(a)
For each (i, j) pair, if ai = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two received qubits corresponding to xij, otherwise he does nothing.
(b) For each (i, j) pair, Bob permutes the two qubits corresponding to (i, j) with probability 1 2 . (c) Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, but withholding part of the information about the measurement outcomes: he calculates the XOR of the two measurement outcomes in the teleportation of each qubit, and calculate the XOR of the obtained two bits in each pair, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Thus, without doing any corrections, Alice receives the two qubits with a possible σy mask for each qubit, together with possible σz masks on an even number of qubits in each pair of qubits. If the σy correction is needed for one received qubit, we regard Bob's mask bit for that qubit as 1, and otherwise we regard it as 0.
because of the following: in the case of an inconclusive measurement outcome of her POVM to distinguish Bob's two programs, she can not deterministically and correctly find out Bob's values of the logical mask bit (the XOR of his two local mask bits) since that needs a measurement incompatible with that POVM she performed. Thus Alice would have significant probability of error in learning the logical mask bit of Bob's. But she could use joint measurements across different j to increase her probability of success in learning both Bob's input and the overall mask bit of Bob's, which has been confirmed by numerical calculations. As a result of this type of attack, we estimate that Alice would have significant probability of guessing both the output bit and Bob's overall logical mask bit for a particular variable x i . Since a variable will appear for many times in the Scheme 4 below, it can be estimated that she would have some constant probability of guessing correctly both the contribution to the output from the variable x i (which requires guessing the contribution at each step correctly), and the overall mask bit of Bob's related to that variable. That is why we would need Alice to send a constant number of bits for verification in Scheme 5 below, as sending one bit is not conclusive enough.
(2) About Scheme 4. The following Scheme 4 is an interactive scheme. It has asymptotic data privacy but the circuit privacy is not good. Later in Scheme 5 we add some artificial verifications for improving circuit privacy.
In Scheme 4, we denote an upper bound on the number of T gates in the desired circuit as R. The scheme makes use of some ideas from the computationally-secure QHE scheme TP in [8] : the idea of teleporting the state to Bob's side to let him do the gates; and the garden-hose construction for doing a Clifford gate depending on the exclusive-OR of two bits at opposite parties (Appendix B). It also uses many instances of Scheme 3 (called the lower-level scheme here), except the very last small step in it, namely the correction of the output bit by Alice according to Bob's message. This is because in Scheme 4 we hope to reduce Bob's messages to Alice as much as possible, for improving circuit privacy. The general structure of the scheme in [8] is that Alice first teleports the input state to Bob's side, but withholds the Pauli keys, and Bob performs the Clifford gates and the T gates in the desired circuit, while the corrections are calculated with the help of a classical HE scheme and some measurement on some EPR pairs (based on the "garden hose" technique developed in some related papers). In this work we get rid of the classical HE scheme, and only use the most elementary instance of the "garden hose" model. By combining Scheme 3 with the simple "garden hose" model in Appendix B, we obtain an interactive QHE scheme.
In the scheme, we make use of the following polynomials to update the initial Pauli keys. The f a,i and f b,i (i = 1, . . . , n) are key-updating polynomials which are linear polynomials in 2n + 4R variables. All variables are in the finite field F 2 . The first 2n variables are the initial Pauli keys a, i and b, i (i = 1, . . . , n), corresponding to the Pauli operator . (If these 4R variables are not introduced, Alice would need to tell the Bell-state measurement outcomes to Bob, making the data less secure for a cheating Bob.)
The initial 2n variables are unchanged at each Clifford stage in the circuit. Bob changes the coefficients for them in the polynomials in instances of Scheme 3. The way Bob changes the coefficients is because of some key-update rules, and we call them effective key-update rules below, since they do not change Alice's keys but rather change Bob's coefficients. The effective key-update rules for the first 2n variables under the action of Clifford gates are reversible (hence no new variables need to be introduced), and they can be easily obtained from the following relations:
where the ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and in the gate CNOT 12 , the qubit 1 is the control. The effective key-update rules for the first 2n variables under the T gate can be obtained from the relations TZ = ZT, TX = e −πi/4 PXZT.
More details about the key-update rules are in [7, 8] . The Scheme 4 works for any quantum input, including states with complex amplitudes, and mixed states. There are 2n + R instances of Scheme 3 in Scheme 4. There are R instances of the gadget in Appendix B for correcting an unwanted P gate after a T gate, up to Pauli corrections.
The correctness of Scheme 4 follows from the correctness of Scheme 3 and our way of using the scheme TP in [8] . Since each input variable appears for O(n + R) times (for example, in each of the R polynomials related to T gates), it is necessary to set the parameter k to be sufficiently large, while the circuit size needs to be multiplied by a factor to allow recompilation of the original circuit into a form not easily guessed by Alice from partial information about the coefficients in the polynomials. In the following, we give some estimate under the requirement of asymptotic data privacy; the circuit privacy is to be improved in Scheme 5. As mentioned previously, it is necessary to set k = O(log 1 ǫ ) to hide the data in one instance of Scheme 3. Since each input variable of Alice's appear for at most O(n + R) times in Scheme 4, to let the data privacy be independent of the correctness of evaluation, it suffices to set k = O[log( n+R ǫ )], where ǫ is a small positive real number describing the leak of information about an input qubit of Alice's. An ǫ near zero means that the qubit is almost secure. The total classical communication cost and entanglement cost are O[(n 2 + nR) log( n+R ǫ )] (bits and ebits, respectively), as there are O(n + R) instances of the lower-level scheme, each of which uses O(nk) = O[n log( n+R ǫ )] EPR pairs and an proportional amount of classical communication. We now discuss the circuit privacy in Scheme 4. If Alice honestly follows the protocol, the bits sent by Bob during the instances of the lower-level scheme do not actually carry useful information about his circuit, thus she learns at most O(n) bits about the circuit, according to the analysis after Scheme 3. This degree of circuit privacy is already optimal for general unitary circuits, since Alice could always use dense coding to learn about 2n bits from the output Scheme 4 Partially-secure interactive QHE for general quantum input 1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice performs the local operations in teleporting the n encrypted data qubits to Bob without sending any message to Bob. This means Bob instantly receives n data qubits with unknown Pauli masks. She keeps a classical copy of the Pauli keys corresponding to the measurement results in teleportations. The two parties agree on a positive integer k which is related to the security of the scheme.
2. For each of the R Clifford stages before a T gate in the target circuit, the two parties do the following.
(a) According to the desired circuit, Bob performs local Clifford gates on the "received" n data qubits. For the T gate in the desired circuit, Bob does the T gate.
(b) The two parties do an instance of Scheme 3 (with the sending of the last bit by Bob and the last bit flip by Alice in Scheme 3 omitted, and called "the lower-level scheme" below). This requires Bob to wait for Alice's message before he does quantum operations, but while waiting, he could do some local classical calculations for finding the coefficients in the polynomials (including the constant term c in the polynomial) to be used in the instance of Scheme 3. The coefficients are calculated based on Bob's previous measurement outcomes, his outcomes in previous instances of the lower-level scheme, and his knowledge about the desired circuit. Alice performs her first part of operations in this instance of the lower-level scheme (up to sending messages to Bob), with the 2n variables being the initial Pauli keys, and 4R variables being her Bell-state measurement outcomes (the outcomes for those measurements not yet carried out are regarded as zero). After receiving Alice's message, Bob performs his part of operations in the lower-level scheme, and this includes sending some messages to Alice which are functions of measurement outcomes in the teleportations. After receiving Bob's message, Alice does the remaining operations in the lower-level scheme. Each party obtains a bit as their outcome for the instance of the lower-level scheme.
(c) The XOR value of the two bits obtained above indicates whether a P † correction needs to be performed. The two parties perform the Bell-state measurements in the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B locally, without any communication. (Since Alice's Bell-state measurements, not including the P † gates, are independent of her input bit, there are only 4 bits for the outcomes of Bell-state measurements in each use of the gadget in Appendix B.)
3. Bob does the final stage of Clifford gates in the desired circuit on the encoded data qubits. He does local operations in teleporting the n encoded data qubits to Alice, but without sending her the measurement outcomes in the teleportation.
4. Alice and Bob perform the following procedure 2n times in parallel, each for calculating a Pauli key on one of the n output qubits in the higher-level scheme. The procedure is as follows: Bob does classical calculations to find a polynomial. The coefficients of the polynomial are determined from Bob's previous measurement outcomes, his outcomes in previous instances of the lower-level scheme from step 2 above, and his knowledge about the desired circuit. Alice performs the first part of operations in an instance of the lower-level scheme (up to sending messages to Bob) with the input data being her 2n initial encryption keys and 4R bits which are outcomes of her previous Bell-state measurements. After receiving Alice's message, Bob performs the gates and measurements in the instance of the lower-level scheme. Bob corrects his part of the correction key (one bit) using some measurement outcome in teleportation in the previous step 3, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Alice completes the last part of the lower-level scheme and uses the bit from Bob's message to correct the outcome, and regards the result as a Pauli correction key in the higher-level scheme.
5.
Alice applies Pauli gates on the data qubits according to the keys from the last step, to get the output state.
of the computation; and since we do not allow the use of initial entangled states for an honest Alice, she in fact learns only n bits. If Alice cheats by using some other input state for each instance of the lower-level scheme, she could learn more information about the circuit, see the discussion after Scheme 3. A method for improving circuit privacy is in the following Scheme 5.
(3) About Scheme 5. The Scheme 5 is based on Scheme 4. The general idea is that Bob asks Alice to return some messages as outputs for his embedded checking procedures, and Bob aborts the protocol if the returned messages are not as expected. In this way, Bob verifies the quantum computation for the original circuit. This is inspired by the results in the literature that a quantum verifier can verify the result of a polynomial-sized quantum computation of a prover. Some protocols of verification for different types of blind quantum computing have been constructed [25] [26] [27] . The verification protocol [28] is not intended for blind quantum computing. A computationally-secure QFHE scheme Scheme 5 Interactive QHE with embedded verifications for improving circuit privacy 1. It is assumed that Alice and Bob agree on an instance of Scheme 4, that is, each party knows what he or she should know about the instance of the scheme.
2. Bob revises the original circuit by adding a constant number of auxiliary qubits initially in Pauli eigenstates on his side, and let these qubits undergo some joint gates with the data qubits, where the gates are chosen randomly and include some T gates, satisfying that each added qubit becomes a Pauli eigenstate independent of Alice's input data at some stage in the circuit. The circuit in the added part of the protocol is implemented in the same way as in Scheme 4.
In the redesigned protocol, Alice sends Bob some number of bits, each of which is her part of the distributed outcome of an added instance of reduced Scheme 3 ("reduced" means without Bob sending her the last bit and without her subsequent correction), and they represent Pauli masks (due to the combined effect of some Bell-state measurements in some instances of the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B) for some auxiliary qubits at various steps in the protocol, for him to check if Alice has cheated. with verification is given in [23] .
Alice and
The reason that verifications are of significant help here is because of a property of Scheme 4: Alice's knowledge about (the current part of) Bob's program does not mean she can send back the correct messages. This is because Bob verifies Alice's messages against his mask bits, which are unknown to the honest Alice, and a cheating Alice cannot (almost) deterministically find out those mask bits while (almost) deterministically learning about the related part of Bob's program at the same time, since the two tasks involve incompatible measurements. An error of Alice, which can also be stated as an error of the distributed result in an instance of Scheme 3, will affect the correctness of removing unwanted P after each T gate. Consequently, due to the T gates added in the random gates in Scheme 5, Alice has large probability of returning some wrong classical message, resulting in wrong state of Bob's auxiliary qubits after he corrects such qubits according to Alice's message.
Here is an explanation for the "added instance of reduced Scheme 3" in Scheme 5. Such instance is for computing a polynomial whose output is a bit, representing whether some Pauli Z or X correction should be performed on some qubit on Bob's side, and Bob will later measure those qubits in some suitable Pauli basis to find out whether Alice has cheated. The input variables for such polynomial should be the (at most) 2n + 4R variables in Scheme 4, but since the verification is supposed to be independent of the input data, the 2n variables actually have zero coefficients (for honest Bob), and the remaining (at most) 4R variables are from Alice's Bell-state measurements in some instances of the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B.
By choosing the level of data privacy in the original scheme suitably, the Scheme 5 keeps the original data qubits quite secure with the exception that the verification messages may reveal information about the data. Since the total length of such messages is limited to a constant (see the expression of m below), the amount of information leak introduced by the revision compared to Scheme 4 is a constant. Thus, the data privacy may be quite satisfactory, especially in the applications in which partial information about the data do not reveal much useful information, say when the input is already the output of some hashing procedure (or the encryption procedure in some classical homomorphic encryption scheme) acting on some original data. By choosing a suitable number of check bits from Alice, the circuit privacy in Scheme 5 can be enhanced to a satisfactory level: suppose there are m check bits, then since a cheating Alice would return a wrong bit with some constant probability (a cheating Alice should cheat at almost all places in the protocol, otherwise she learns little about the circuit due to the possible different decompositions of the circuit; see also the analysis about circuit privacy after Scheme 3), the probability that at least one check bit is wrong is about 1 − c m , where c ∈ (0, 1) is a constant real number. If the desired level of the probability that a cheating Alice is not caught is δ, we may set m = O(log 1 δ ). Consequently, the Scheme 5 keeps all but O(log 1 δ ) qubits of the input secure, and there is 1 − c ′ δ chance that the information about Bob's intended circuit is asymptotically secure except for an amount proportional to input size, where c ′ is a constant related to the prior probability that Alice may cheat. Random recompilation of the circuit may help circuit privacy. For some simple types of circuits, such as Clifford circuits, it may be helpful to recompile the circuit to fit it into a more complex class of circuits. Enlarging the circuit size by a constant factor is already sufficient to allow for many different forms of the original circuit.
Note that a purely classical client may be used in the verification of quantum computation [23, 24] (at least in the case of classical input and output), but this is based on computational assumptions, thus it is out of the situations considered in Scheme 5. We leave as an open problem whether the method in [24] or [23] together with Scheme 4 can be used to construct an interactive QHE scheme with classical client with better security than that in [10] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have constructed a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for a restricted type of circuits with perfect data privacy for real product input states. We then constructed a QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomialdepth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good circuit privacy. The entanglement and classical communication costs scale linearly with the product of input size and circuit depth. We then introduced the interactive Scheme 4 for general polynomial-sized quantum circuits, which has asymptotic data privacy, but the circuit privacy is not good. We proposed Scheme 5 for improving circuit privacy by embedded verifications, while the data privacy is good except for a leak of a constant number of bits. It works for the case that the input size is larger than some constant determined by the security requirements.
The reason why rebits are used in Schemes 1 and 2 here is to avoid data leakage: if qubits with complex amplitudes are used, after some measurements are done on the Alice side in the protocol, and the outcomes are sent to Bob, it is often the case that some information about the data would have been sent to Bob. It would be good to understand better the "phase qubit" and its possible applications. It would also be good to combine the techniques in Schemes 1 and 2 with those in Scheme 4 to yield a better protocol.
Some further issues to investigate include: a better characterization of the type of circuits allowed in Scheme 2; how to optimize the schemes for particular sets of allowed circuits; how to turn Scheme 4 into a non-interactive scheme (possibly restricting the type of circuits or with compromise on security); how to make the schemes faulttolerant; the verifiability of the steps of Scheme 4 against Bob's cheating (note that it is currently dealt with by choosing the parameter k large enough to make the data sufficiently secure even if Bob may cheat); whether there are corresponding schemes in the measurement-based computing model. In view of the results on classical-client blind quantum computing by Mantri et al [19] , and computationally-secure QHE scheme with classical client [10] , we may ask whether in a QHE scheme with good data privacy and circuit privacy for polynomial-sized circuits, the party with the initial program can be fully classical (possibly with some compromise on circuit privacy and data privacy). nonzero g i and h i cancel out [it must be that their resulting R y (π) operators on the phase-qubit line also cancel out], then we may remove these operators, and change these g i and h i (and associated g ′ i and h ′ i , if any) to zero, without affecting Eqs. (A1) and (A2) (which is due to the definition of g ′ i and h ′ i and the types of gates in the circuit), and look at a reduced case with fewer nonzero g i and h i . After these reductions, we have that on at least one qubit line, the operators do not cancel out. [If no such line exists, Eq. A1 is violated.] We may cancel out the R y (π) operators on the same line in pairs, without affecting the two equations, so that only one or two operators remain on each line. On each data qubit other than the first data qubit, either there is no correction operator, in which case this line can be removed without affecting the two equations, or there is only one R y (π) operator, which when applied on the real input state on that data qubit would give rise to zero trace on Alice's side. Now we consider the operators on the first data qubit and the phase qubit. If the joint operator on these two qubits is not the identity, it must be one of the following: R y (π) ⊗ I, or X ⊗ R y (π), or Z ⊗ R y (π). Since the initial state on these two qubits are real, it can be found that these operators map the initial state to an orthogonal state. Therefore the partial trace on Alice side is zero, which implies that the term satisfying Eq. (A1) must vanish. Thus it must be that no initial mask pattern may change any off-diagonal term in Bob's reduced density operator.
In the above, we have shown that for any pure input state of the required type, and its padded states [with possible R y (π) gates applied on some qubits, possibly including the phase qubit], the reduced density operators of Bob's system after correcting for Alice's measurement outcomes are the same. Thus for such input states, Bob's reduced density operator is equal to that for the input being the average state of all padded states, which is a fixed maximally-mixed state. Thus, these reduced density operators of Bob's are fixed regardless of what the pure input state is. The case of probabilistic mixture of such states follows by linearity. Thus Bob does not receive any information about the input data.
⊓ ⊔
(2). Proof for Theorem 2.
Proof. (i) As in the proof of Theorem 1, to consider a change from one of the two input states to the other, we only need to consider applying R y (π) on each data qubit and a R y (θ) on the phase qubit. These operators commute through the circuit, and they sometimes become X operators, resulting in some Z operators on some of Bob's qubits.
Consider an off-diagonal term in Bob's reduced density matrix. Such term does not vanish if and only if some R y (π) operators on some data-qubit lines in some "difference" circuit commute back to the beginning of the circuit and meet with the input state to yield nonzero trace on Alice's side. Such nonzero trace only occurs when there are an even number of R y (π) in the "difference" circuit that are in positions that were subject to X operators in the original circuit (each resulting in a Z operator on one of Bob's qubits). From Eq. A1, this means that Bob's off-diagonal term does not vanish only when it is not affected by the choice of input state (between the two possible input states). Thus, Bob's reduced density matrix is independent of the choice of input state (between the two possible input states).
(ii) This part is similar to the part of proof of Theorem 1 about the security of the encoded qubit. The one-qubit Pauli operators on the data qubit in the proof of Theorem 1 are replaced with operators on some data qubits here. In particular, the R y (π) on the data qubit is replaced with R y (π) on an odd number of data qubits together with X on an even number of data qubits, where the two sets of qubits may have overlap. The argument follows simply from (i) and the proof of Theorem 1. ⊓ ⊔ [8] for applying a P † to a qubit initially at the position "in" if and only if p + q = 1 (mod 2), using the "garden hose" method. The dots connected by wavy lines are EPR pairs. The curved lines are for Bell-state measurements. For example, if p = 0 and q = 1, the qubit is teleported through the first and the third EPR pairs, with a P † applied to it by Alice in between. The state of the input qubit always ends up in a qubit on Bob's side, and the position depends on Bob's input bit p: if p = 0, the output is on the qubit labeled "out1", otherwise it is on the qubit labeled "out2". Note that in each use of this gadget, only 3 Bell-state measurements are actually performed; Alice's Bell-state measurements are on the same pairs qubits irrespective of q.
